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BOOK REVIEWS
Federalism as a Democratic Process. By Roscoe Pound, Charles H.
McIlwain, and Roy F. Nichols. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1942. Pp. 90. $1.25.
A thin but pungent sheaf of essays. Roscoe Pound, Charles McIlwain, and Roy F. Nichols present their views on varying aspects of
federalism. A short commentary by Francis W. Coker criticizes the
essay of McIlwain, and Edward Samuel Corwin presents a similar comment on the work of Nichols.
Dean Pounds' essay is deserving of its title, "Law and Federal
Government." He analyzes the necessity for legal checks and balances
in the preservation of a federal society, and answers the carping critics
who maintain that federalism and democracy are inconsistent and cannot logically exist together. The modern followers of what he terms
the "cult of force" hold to the view that law must be imposed by a
force capable of imposing itself on all other forces. Hence there is
nothing to law but force and whatever is done by those who wield the
force is the law. They insist that in order for a democracy to be
absolute there must be no constitutional restraints imposed on the will
of the majority as exercised by the "omnicompetent" leaders of the
democracy. Pound replies that there is no inconsistency in maintaining
that a democracy might have ultimate unlimited powers and yet impose
limits upon the exercise of those powers by its agents. He points out
that the history of civilization displays an increasing restraint upon
force and that in federalism this salutary restraint is effected through
a balance maintained between the central and local authorities, between
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, and
between the politically organized society and the individual.
In recognition of those critics who feel that the whole philosophy of
balance has become obsolete, Pound concedes that constant balance has
not always been maintained. He ably points out that there has been
a shift in dominance among the three constitutional branches of the
government in accordance with their development; i.e., that the legislative branch was predominant from the time of the Revolution to the
Civil War, that the nineteenth-century emphasis on reduction of law
to hard and fast rules then led to the eminence of the judiciary, and
that in the present the executive branch has come to the fore. There
is a penetrating -discussion of the shift of balance in local and central
authority relations. At first, a provincial pride in local government and
in legal quirks peculiar to certain sections operated to preserve the
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philosophy of decentralization. Then the influence of great national
law schools teaching a general rather than local law, the work of committees on uniform laws, and above all the insistent pressure of fast
transportation and economic unification brought about the present trend
toward nationalism and centralized authority.
One of the primary foundations for Pound's faith in the efficacy of
federalism is his belief that though there is a constant shift in the
balance of power, no government department has ever obtained more
than a temporary dominance; and though the relation between central
and local authority may vary in one direction or the other, some compensatory factor always tends to force it back. In support of this latter
tenet he points to the fact that during the height of the decentralization
period the federal courts all followed their own system of substantive
law, thus providing a standard law in all federal courts throughout the
land,1 whereas now in the midst of the movement toward uniform law
the federal courts have decided to adhere to the local law of the state in
which they sit.2 Be that as it may. In the mind of this reviewer, the
power of such a decision to bring about diffusion of authority is but as
a straw against the flood when contrasted with the focalizing effect of
recent extensions of central control under the guise of protection of
interstate commerce.3
At any rate, Dean Pound believes that the constant shift in balance
indicates a wonderful ability of American federalism to adapt~itself to
changing social and economic conditions. Conceding that no hard and
fast lines of balance can be drawn, he nevertheless feels that this does
not warrant abandonment of the eminently practical concept of balance
through adherence to certain lines of division as closely as possible. In
this respect he draws the erudite analogy that Einstein's discovery of
the non-existence of straight lines does not require the abandonment of
surveying.
In discussion of the relation of the individual to the state, Dean
Pound reiterates the trite proposition that if too much importance is
placed on the freedom and satisfaction of the individual personality the
result is anarchy, if too much emphasis is given to preservation of the
politically organized society the result is autocracy, and that the best
polity will adopt the relation of the individual to his government which
best serves the advancement of human civilization. He seems to think
the American federal system has achieved this latter end.
In conclusion, Dean Pound avers that federal polity necessitates
'Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (1842).
'Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1146, 114
A. L. 1L 1487 (1938).
1Wickard v. Filburn, - U. S. -, 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 57
(1942).
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legal restraint to hold the whole and the parts to their separate spheres.
But it also requires separation or distribution of power because a concentration in any place would threaten the regime of balance and cut
off the means of restoring the balance when disturbed. As a parting
shot it is defiantly asserted that if a federal or restrained democracy is
logically and philosophically impossible, nevertheless our experience has
shown that it works well in practice.
Mr. Mclhvain traces some of the sources of our American federalism. In his essay he thoroughly surveys a literary controversy
which came on the scene shortly prior to the Revolution as to whether
the British polity was one of absolute centralized authority or whether
it was leavened with many instances of separation of powers. Because
some early pamphlets discussing this problem were known to a few of
the framers of the Constitution, Mr. McIlwain concludes that much of
our concept of federalism was derived from the balance of central
government and local self-government achieved in medieval England.
He is taken to task for this non sequitur by Mr. Coker in a comment
on the Mcllwain essay.
Mr. Nichols presents an acute analysis of how a difference of
opinion on the question of central control versus local self-government
led to a bifurcation of American political thought and, coupled with economic differences, eventually resulted in civil war. In his commentary
on this essay Mr. Corwin finds little to criticize except minor details.
If this review has devoted much space to Dean Pound and little to
the other contributors to the book, it should not be inferred that his
work is better. Indeed, the whole book is excellent. But Pound's essay
delves into the principles underlying the concept of federalism instead
of presenting an anlysis of some of its historical phases. Because of
this difference in subject-matter his material is more thought-provoking
and timely. Another reason for extended comment is the absence of
any commentary on his work in the volume itself. But indeed the only
criticism which could be offered is that he dismisses the arguments of
the proponents of economic determinism much too lightly and paints too
rosy a picture of our federal system.
This is not a utilitarian book. It is one for scholars and theorists
rather than for hard-minded practical men. But for those who are
interested in political philosophy the reading of it is a delightful
experience.
JOHN

Student Editor-in-Chief,
NORTH CAROLINA LAW

REviEW, 1942-43.

T. KILPATRICK,

JR.
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Federal Taxation for the Lawyer. By Houstin Shockey.
Prentice-Hall, -Inc. 1941. Pp. xiii, 408. $5.00.

New York:

The purpose and scope of this book are quite accurately represented
by its title. It is legalistic in its point of view, and is not for the layman. At the same time, it is for the average lawyer, who is not a tax
specialist; although, as will presently appear, even the specialist will
find it often suggestive and helpful. Accordingly, the author seeks to
point out the important principles of the more important federal taxes,
without making any attempt to go into details. The idea is to warn
the average lawyer of some of the more important pitfalls which federal taxation has dlug for the unwary, and to suggest some ways around
such pitfalls. Obviously the primary purpose is to create a general
attitude of awareness and caution, rather than to deal with all or even
a substantial portion of the problems. The hypothetical cases which are
put and discussed, and which cover the bulk of the text, seem to be
well chosen from this standpoint.
The preface expresses the opinion that the principles of federal taxes
"are as stable as those in other fields of law." Perhaps this is a bit
optimistic. At any rate, the book was somewhat out of date even before
the Revenue Act of 1942, since it harks back to the comparatively
peaceful days of the -defense tax of 1940. More unfortunate still are
the changes of the 1942 Act, which more or less invalidate, or at least
modify, many of the examples in this book. These are not merely the
provisions changing the rates of tax and the basis of capital gains, but
such fundamental changes in the income tax as those respecting pension
trusts and income to lessors through improvements by tenants; and in the
estate tax, the broadening of. taxable powers of appointment, the removal of the special insurance exemption, and the provision giving a
deduction for contracts to make charitable gifts. With all these and
many other changes, not to speak of the fundamental changes in the
excess profits tax, which the author hopefully suggests is really less
complicated than it looks, one does have some doubts as to whether
many stable principles remain.
As already suggested, the author has not entirely resisted the tendency to oversimplification, which the plan of his book almost compels;
though it should be stated that he has been more successful in avoiding
this difficulty than might have been expected. But it seems that he
does not adequately portray the difficulty of distinguishing and applying the cash and accrual methods of reporting income, though he does
admit the uncertainty of the accrual concept. The distinction between
capital expenditures and repairs also looks less difficult in this book
than it actually is; and the same is true of partnership problems. More
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troublesome still is the handling of the relation between inheritance and
income taxes. The bland statement that all state taxes are on the right
to receive is certainly unjustified. The same is true of the statement
that no legacy or inheritance is subject to income tax. This may be
literally true, but the distinction which the courts have made on this
point are not those which would seem obvious, even to the lawyer.
Finally, the author's position that dividends paid in the same class
of stock on which they are declared are non-taxable, while dividends
paid in a different class of stock are taxable, is at least doubtful. Indeed, it now appears not improbable that the Supreme Court may
entirely reverse its 1920 position and hold all stock dividends taxable.
But no doubt it would be somewhat unreasonable to expect anyone to
anticipate this even two or three years ago, and the position of the
author must be regarded as rather conservative.
This conservative viewpoint is generally taken, and adds to the
value of the book, especially from the standpoint of the lawyer who
wishes to keep as far away from difficulty as possible. There are
several warnings of possible unfavorable changes' in the law. To be
sure the author did not envisage the sad sight which we have seen
recently of the Treasury Department seeking to wipe out exemptions
on existing tax-exempt bonds; but certainly no one could have been
expected to foresee such an apparent breach of faith, from which Congress has rescued us, at least for the time being.
There are a number of other points where the author has avowedly
taken the more unfavorable of possible constructions. For instance, he
has somewhat narrowly defined the scope of non-taxable exchanges,
and particularly has denied the possibility of three-party reorganizations. Similarly, he may be too severe with respect to trust income
which may be used to pay obligations of a grantor; and he certainly
gives too much scope in -some places to the administrative discretion of
the Commissioner, which even now has some limits. And his views as
to valuation of stocks, and especially the blockage rule, may well be too
favorable to the government.
Moreover, it seems clear that his position that a lessor whose tenant
is bound to keep the premises in repair is not entitled to depreciation,
is unsound. Likewise, the acceptance of the position that either a
corporation or stockholders may be subject to a gift tax, though supported by the regulations, is nevertheless rather clearly contrary to the
statute. But in all these and perhaps other cases it may be said that if
the author is mistaken, his mistake is in the right direction. He is
quite right in resolving all disputes against the taxpayer since he is primarily writing for the benefit of those who wish to avoid controversies.
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Even so, there are a few cases where advice directed to avoiding
taxes is questionable. One such instance is that the book gives only one
reference to constructive receipt, and this does not emphasize the danger
to the taxpayer from this doctrine. Another is the failure to point out
that bad debts arising from income transactions are not deductible at
all unless the income has been accrued and taxed. In two other cases,
where the author suggests a demolition of an old building for the purpose of establishing a deductible loss, before the property is sold, and
that stockholders should sell their stock prior to the adoption of a plan
of liquidation, there might be some possible question of good faith.
But this is unusual. Far more typical of the book as a whole is the
brief but excellent discussion of the Hallock case and its possible unfortunate implications, the statement of the unfortunate results from
the transfer of securities to a related taxpayer, and the excellent warning concerning the necessity of a business purpose in reorganizations,
in order to sustain non-taxability.
in addition to all this, the book contains some interesting practical
suggestions, not a fe* of whicl might not occur even to the tax specialist. An example is the showing of the possible, advantage in deliberately
taking a gain on washi sales, where a loss would of course not be deductible. Another is the desirability of allocating a nominal price for
an agreement not to compete, on the sale of a business. There are also
valuable suggestions with respect to turning over property on which
there is an accrued gain to a partner, and the danger of assuming mortgages in a non-corporate exchange. Finally may be mentioned the
author's statement of the advantage of establishing a fiscal year beginning late in the calendar year. This means that the annual Revenue
Act ought to have been passed not long after the beginning of the fiscal
year; though the author's statement that it is the practice to pass revenue acts before the end of the year may be regarded as somewhat
optimistic.
The mechanical features of the book are excellent. The printing is
clear, and no errors of proofreading were discovered. One rather
annoying feature is that all of the notes are at the end of the book. But
perhaps this is not so serious, as most of the notes are merely references
to the Prentice-Hall Service, and they need not be consulted except by
a person who is making a somewhat exhaustive study of the particular
point involved. Most users of the book will be content to ignore the
notes, for the most part.
As has been said, the purpose of this book is a rather narrow one
and its scope is correspondingly restricted. Nevertheless, the purpose is
a worthwhile one, and the scope is broad enough for that purpose. On
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the whole it is excellently done and it should be very useful. Its most
serious -defect is that it is already out of date. A new edition seems
td be called for, a project which would indeed be worth while.
ROBERT

C.

BROWN.

Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
Eulogy of Judges. By Piero Calamandrei. Translated by John Clark
Adams and C. Abbott Phillips, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1942. Pp. ii, 121. $2.00.
With this translation the author of Eulogy of Judges makes his
first appearance in English. One of the translators came to know him
by sitting in one of his law classes in Italy. As he grew to know and
appreciate the author he determined to translate Eulogy of Judges.
The book does not lend itself readily to review. Words of praise
or condemnation could be spoken about it, of course. But any attempt
to give a true picture of the contents will almost certainly fail.
Broadly speaking, the subject of the book can be said to be lawyers
and judges. That, however, portrays nbthing, for that is a broad subject with many facets. To give an 'adequate picture of the contents of
a book one should ordinarily be specific. Yet any attempt to be specific
in this case-to say that the writer has treated of such and such a
corner of the general subject matter-would render the review incomplete, for in the 121 pages of this volume the author has managed to
touch on many facets of the general subject of lawyers and judges.
This can best be illustrated by a glimpse at the chapter headings. They
are as follows: On Faith in Judges; On Etiquette in Court; On Certain Similarities and Differences Between Judge and Lawyer; On
Forensic Oratory; On a Certain Immobility of Judges on the Bench;
On the Relationship Between the Lawyer and the Truth, or On the
Necessary Partisanship of the Lawyer; On Certain Aberrations of
Clients, for Which the Judge Should Excuse the Lawyer'; On Litigousness; On the Predilection of Judges and Lawyers for Questions of Law
or for Questions of Fact; On Sentiment and Logic in Judicial Decisions;
On the Lawyer's Love for the Judge and Vice Versa; On the Sorrows
and Sacrifices in the Life of the Judge; On the Sorrows and Sacrifices
in the Life of the Lawyer; On the Common Destiny of Judge and
Lawyer.
Although each of these subjects is sufficiently broad to merit a volume by itself, when one has read one of Calamandrei's chapters he has
the feeling that the subject has been thoroughly covered. Perhaps this
is due to the manner in which the book is written. The author has
used an epigrammatic style. Each thought is set out in a paragraph;
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each paragraph stands independently of all others as having a meaning
of its own. A common thread running through each group of paragraphs makes it possible to link them into chapters.
With a faith in the processes and personnel of the courts so unquestioning as to seem almost naive this Italian law teacher has set
down his thoughts. Yet as one reads he becomes convinced that, far
from being naive, the faith in the administration of justice expressed
in this little book stems from a deep wisdom.
This faith characterizes the philosophy of the book. One becomes
aware that here is a man who believes in the innate nobility of his profession, who believes that one of the crowning achievements of man
is that he is able to formulate and administer rules to govern his social
life. Such a faith is novel and refreshing. It is so novel that one,
accustomed to the scepticism of the usual writer, is tempted to laugh
until he makes the discovery that the philosophy here expressed is the
result of a profound wisdom.
The psychological observations contained in the book are on a par
with the philosophical maxims. Calamandrei is a keen observer of the
mental habits of lawyers and judges. With gentle humor he reminds
the lawyers that they are responsible for the judges' propensity toward
sleep during the arguments of the lawyers-that their well-turned
phrases are the soporifics which are so powerful. Yet with a subtle
gibe he reminds the judges that the law is not a "dormitory." Calamandrei is a great believer in the efficacy of brevity in arguments. He
advises the young lawyer to sacrifice clarity for brevity if ever the two
are in conflict. He says that judges love laconic men.
"That day I. was at my best. I was aware of the affectionate sympathy of the judges when I sat down. They smiled upon me with such
warmth that it almost seemed through a miracle of love their arms,
wrapped in their black cloaks, were suddenly lengthened by several
yards so they could reach lown and caress me.
This all happened, if I remember correctly, the -day I arose to say:
'The defense rests.'"
Little gentleness is shown, though, to the unpleasant client. It
seems to be the theory of the author that if there were no clients to
cause trouble the world of the lawyer and the judge would be a noble
and beautiful one. Indeed, this thesis is so well developed that while
reading one becomes aware of a distinct aversion toward clients and is
forced to pull himself up with the question: If there were no clients
where would the lawyers and the judges be?
The book is well written. The thoughts are clear and concise, and
the style is charming in its simplicity. Every now and then the plainness of the book is relieved by passages that approach poetry, and that
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stance in the last chapter is found the following:
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For in-

"But even the office of judge is a pitiless one, and thou also, 0
lawyer, art often pitiless against us. It happens sometimes that in the
heart of the seated magistrate throb all the passions of grieving humanity-the agony of betrayed love, the anxiety of a dying child. But
these voices must be silenced in the courtroom; the heart of the judge
must be unencumbered even when his deepest most secret emotions are
moved. Even if the man feels that the question he is deciding is of a
hundred times less moment than his grief, the judge must deem the
grief a minor thing to the case, no matter how futile, which he is called
upon to decide; and while the man sobs, thinking of the son who died
just yesterday, the magistrate must listen to the defending attorney
who for three hours mercilessly explains why the tenant failed to pay
his rent."
This is not a "practical" book. There is perhaps nothing in it which
would earn a penny for one, nor would anything that is said make it
easier for one to win a case. Yet without doubt the man who reads it
will find himself richer than before in wisdom and enjoyment.
FRED R. EDNEY.
Associate Student Editor-in-Chief,
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW, 1942-43.
If Men Were Angels. By Jerome Frank. New York: Harper Brothers.
1942. Pp. 380. $3.75.
"If men were angels, no government would be necessary." This
quotation from The Federalist furnishes the author with a very apt
title for his book, which proves to be a vigorous defense of administrative
justice in general, and of the Securities Exchange Commission in
particular.
Before his appointment to the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Frank was a member of the SEC, and succeeded Mr.
Justice Douglas as its chairman. His empirical knowledge thus gained
of the workings of this important Commission, together with his experience at the bar and his many scholarly researches and writings
anent the administrative and judicial processes, eminently fit him to be
the author of this administrative apologia, which certainly loses nothing
of persuasiveness when it is remembered that the author, in publishing
the volume, speaks no longer as a federal administrator, but as a United
States circuit judge.
The argument begins with the proposition that all government is
necessarily human-men over men. The phrase "a government of laws,.
and not of men". should not be distorted to mean that "laws" alone are
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sufficient for good government. To put the whole emphasis on "laws,"
and none on the character of "men," would likely "lead to concealed and,
therefore, corrupt or tyrannical personal government." To emphasize
"men" without bothering to impose legal restraints on them, "is to insure unconcealed personal government-dictatorship." The sine qua non
of a democracy is "a government of laws well administered by the right
kind of men." Frank Hogan, former president of the American Bar
Association, is, quoted as saying: "Given a judge of sound judgment,
learned, courageous and independent, and justice will be well administered under almost any system of laws." And speaking of the recommendations of the Wickersham Committee (1931) for "specific changes
in the machinery of criminal prosecutions," the author says: "But
changes in machinery are not sufficient to prevent unfairness. Much
more depends upon the men that operate the machinery," and he insists
that "to the freedoms inherent in a real democracy most of the men in
our national government are devoted," and yet many of them, particularly in the administrative agencies, have been "denigrated" as
devotees of the philosophy of the Nazis or Fascists.
"Waging peace will be more difficult than waging war." It is therefore most important now, while the war still rages, that we examine
our administrative agencies which do "much of the shirt-sleeve work of
government," to quote Mr. justice Douglas, in order to make sure that
our democracy will meet the exigencies of the peace, instead of caving
in as it did after World War I. It is equally important that these
agencies be defended against such denigrations by prejudiced critics.
Chapter IV undertakes "an accurate view" of these administrative
agencies, which is accomplished by quoting "almost in full" the "admirable statement of the reasons for the creation of such agencies" contained in "the unanimous part of the Report" of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies.
Among the "reasons" set out are the limitations on the legislative and
judicial departments, the trend toward preventive legislation, the continuity of attention possible by administrative agencies only, their expert knowledge, and highly specialized staffs of assistants, fixing of
responsibility, etc.
In later chapters Judge Frank shows how carefully the SEC proceeds with its cases. SEC is the agency he knows from the inside at
first hand, and he considers it fairly typical of at least the more important federal commissions. Also, SEC has been particularly maligned,
he thinks, by Dean Roscoe Pound and other critics, and so stands in
peculiar need of defense, lest its modus operandi be badly misunderstood by the public. Dean Pound is conceded to be "a great legal
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scholar," and is named "the most erudite of the critics" of administrative agencies, and inasmuch as "Roscoe Pound in recent writings
has marshalled all the adverse criticism of the administrative agencies,"
the author proceeds to devote much attention to the job of answering
andi refuting Pound's criticisms, most of which he considers to be
flagrant "denigrations."
In the first place Pound has been guilty of many alleged inconsistencies in his writings, and in "Contemporary Juristic Theory"
(1940) he "uttered blanket condemnations of all the administrative
agencies without naming a single one of them, and without giving a
specific reference to any case which illustrates any of his strictures,"
whereas in his earlier writings he was "devoted to elaborate citations
and annotations." Pound's contrast of procedure in courts and administrative bodies gives a completely false picture of the latter, if SEC is
typical. :Specific denigrations, too numerous to mention here, are
refuted one by one (see particularly Appendix VII). Various quotations from the Report of the Attorney General's Committee show approval of SEC. Pound is fond of the clich6 "Administrative absolutism." This "set of snarl-words," this "sesquipedalian vituperation," is
wholly misapplied to SEC, and may be regarded as a part of what has
been called "epithetical jurisprudence,"--this "Poundian innovation"!
When Pound charges that the "juristic realists" (Douglas, Frank,
Cook, Llewellyn, et al.) apply "the economic interpretation to every
problem of politics and jurisprudence," and that they "contemplate the
disappearance of law in a classless society, because law will then be
superseded by an omnicompetent administration and a regime of administrative absolutism," the author sees red! Douglas and Frank are
the only "realists" ever on a federal administrative agency-SEC-and
their ideas on "economic determinism" are substantially at one with
those of that "wisest American legal thinker, Mr. Justice Holmes."
In Chapter VII the author contends that the chief trouble in court
trials is not the legal rules, but the facts. The jury system is wholly
inadequate, and fact finding is finally'guess work-a sort of subjective
reaction to testimony by judge or jury. He criticises the "general
verdict" as a device to give us a "government by jury instead of by
law." But he still believes the jury system in criminal cases should be
retained. Goldstein's book, Trial Technique, shows a law suit in its
true color-a "battle of wits" substituted for the old "battle of bodies"
of the common law, a battle in which the lawyers, not the litigants, are
the real contestants.
Chapter IX shows the administrative agency to be a far more trustworthy finder of facts than a judge or jury. The agency employs
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adequate safeguards for making the case a real attempt to find the
truth, instead -of, as in judicial trials, a battle of wits by opposing lawyers who often intentionally conceal evidence. And the men who compose these agencies are just as honest as the judges, just as fair, just as
carefully selected. Then why distrust the administrators and assume
that justice may be had only in a court? Many administrators and
legislators have been appointed to the various courts, as Hughes to the
Supreme Court. The reviewer might suggest here that Taft would have
been a more striking example, having been lawyer, United States Judge,
cabinet member, Governor of the Philippines, President of the United
States, Yale law professor, and finally Chief Justice of the United
States. Also, a converse example would be Mr. Byrnes, formerly U. S.
Senator, then associate justice of the Supreme Court, and now one of
the President's chief administrators. Query: whether a man who has
been both a judge and a commissioner is more trustworthy in one
capacity than in the other. "It is fair to say that, man for man, federal
administrative officers, exercising quasi-judicial functions, have as much
integrity as federal judges."
The SEC accomplishes much good through its "advance administrative decisions," which are more beneficent than "declaratory judgments" in the courts. Also on the commission's staff are many experts
to aid it in technical matters, whereas, in court, according to Judge
Learned Hand, "a man without any knowledge of the rudiments of
chemistry" must pass on chemical questions.
Business demands and must have, not rigid statutory regulations
alone, but discretionary regulation by administrative agencies. Bureaucracy is necessary, and is not an evil if properly manned. "Critics like
Pound," the author goes on, "who misrepresent the behavior of regulatory commissions ... tend in fact to bring regulation itself into disrepute." John Foster Dulles, eminent corporation lawyer, is not in
sympathy with various proposals emanating from bar associations designed to make impotent the administrative process. No SEC member
wishes to be free from judicial review. That is wholly desirable, and
is provided for in the statutes, but to submit all that the Commission
does to a court would only substitute "lawyercracy" for "democracy."
Tracing back to Aristotle and Plato the genesis of the clich6 "government of laws, not of men," Judge Frank say of Aristotle: "If today
he were a citizen of these United States, he would be efending the
SEC against the diatribes of those who agree with Roscoe Pound's
recent strictures." Separation of powers is likewise considered historically, and found to be rather a political theory than a rule of law.
All three functions of government are exercised by administrative coin-
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missions, but "they do so in an obviously subordinate manner," and
always subject to judicial review. Pound's hero, Coke, is regarded
rather as a royal sycophant, whose blind opposition to the introduction
of equity may be analogous to Pound's polemizations against federal administrative agencies. Furthermore, Coke was high in his praise of the
Privy Council and Star Chamber, on both of which he sat, and each of
which "exercised combined judicial and administrative powers." As
for Coke, the author promises to publish a book soon "in which Coke's
career will be discussed more in detail." This expos6 and Dean Pound's
reaction thereto, may be awaited with interest.
As for checks and balances, "there is a middle road. Some checks
we need, but not too many." And Woodrow Wilson is quoted: "Government is not a machine, but a living thing. No living thing can have
its organs offset against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary, life is dependant on their cooperation."
Finally the author holds that belief in the efficacy of mere governmental machines is fatuous. We must have an independent judiciary,
but the judges, as well as administrative officials, are not angels, but
human beings. "So we conclude where we began: We need efficient
governmental machinery. But, in a democracy, we xnust also insist
upon a government of laws well administered by the right kind of men.
If we do not select men who have both faith in democracy and the ability
to make it efficient-at the same time avoiding the arbitrary use of power
to invade those civil liberties which are the essence of democracy-may
God help us. And let us not forget, that, usually, God helps them who
are able and willing to help themselves."
This book consists of eighteen chapters, supplemented by eight
appendices which are interestingly illuminating. The revigwer would
very much prefer the notes carried as footnotes, rather than in the back
of the volume. This review may well close by quoting the dedication,
which shows vividly the author's high regard for a person and for an
institution: "To Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas, who, while chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, superlatively demonstrated
that effective administration can be made an important instrument of
true democracy."
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